

SAP Security webcast NIS2 with SAP

Public



## Speakers

## **Michael Altmaier**



Principal Security Architect

## Agenda

- EU NIS2
   The Directive in a nutshell
- MCF
   A Framework for Multi-Compliance
- Points of View
   Start for Managing Cybersecurity Compliance
- In more detail
  The Assessment Point of View
- Customer Success SAP Services for Cybersecurity Compliance

## **Drivers for Managing Cybersecurity Compliance**



We aim to assist our customers in aligning their SAP security measures with regulations, widely-accepted norms, and established standards.

RISE or GROW with SAP and face new Cybersecurity challenges in the SAP landscape?



Impacted by new Cybersecurity regulations and must take appropriate action?



Unsure about the status of currently implemented SAP Cybersecurity measures?



Prepared for upcoming Cybersecurity compliance audits or working on existing findings?



## Implementing Compliance – The chain: Why? What? How?

WHY?
Obligations

WHAT?
Requirements

HOW?
Controls







## **EU NIS2 requirements and affected industries**



#### Effective as of 18th of October 2024:

- Registration with national authorities
- Reporting of security incidents
- Compliance with security requirements
- Regular proof of compliance (certification/ audit)



#### **Cybersecurity Requirements:**

- Policies/guidelines
- Incident management
- Business continuity
- Supply chain security
- Training
- Asset management
- Obligation to reporting



#### Strict reporting obligations:

- Up to 24hours: Reporting of incidents
- Up to 72hours: Reporting of indicators of compromise
- Up to 1 month: Final report



#### Fines:

- Personal liability of the management board
- high fines for breaches of security measures: up to 10 Mio. Euro or 2% of global turnover

#### Affected Industries since NIS1



Energy



Financial market infrastructures



Healthcare



Drinking water

Digital infrastructure/networks



Transportation



Nutrition

#### Additional sectors since NIS2



Digital service providers

Research

services



Banking



Post & courier Waste water



Space



Public administration



Chemistry



Industry / production



Waste



ICT service providers

Company	# of Employees		Revenue		Balance sheet		
Medium-sized	50-249	&	< 50 Mio. Euros	& / or	< 43 Mio. Euros		
large	>250	&	>= 50 Mio. Euros	&/or	>= 43 Mio. Euros		

<sup>\*</sup>furthermore: Companies with critical operations and public policy implications, systemic risks or cross-border impacts

## **EU NIS2** minimum requirements for Cybersecurity

Facilities within the EU must implement at least the following cybersecurity measures (risk management) to protect the IT and networks of their critical services:

- Policies on risk analysis and information system security
- Prevention, detection, and handling of cyber incidents
- Policies and procedures regarding cryptography and encryption
- Human Resources Security
- Access control
- Asset management
- Use of multi-factor authentication or continuous authentication solutions
- Policies and procedures to assess risk management measures

- Basic cyber hygiene practices and cybersecurity training
- Use of secure voice, video, and text communication
- Use of secured emergency communication systems
- Business continuity management with backup and disaster recovery, crisis management
- Security in the supply chain, up to secure development at suppliers
- Security in the acquisition, development and maintenance of IT and network systems, incl. vulnerability management and disclosure

In the selection and implementation of measures, institutions shall use an all-hazards approach.

MCF – A Framework for Multi-Compliance

# What is the relationship between NIS2 Directive article and ABAP profile parameter?

EU NIS2 ART. 21.2 (h) AND SNC/ENABLE = 1

## EU NIS2 Art 21.2. (h) – Direct mapping

descriptive, process-oriented, risk-focused

detailed, specific, technical, implementation-related





**EU NIS2 Art. 21.2. (h)** 

Policies and <u>procedures</u> regarding the use of cryptography and, where appropriate, <u>encryption</u>

<u>DE NIS2UmsuCG §30 (2) Nr. 8</u> Kryptografie und Verschlüsselung



**NETENC-A** 

**Encryption** of ABAP Network Connections



snc/enable = 1

snc/data\_protection/min = 3
snc/data\_protection/max = 3
snc/data\_protection/use = 3
snc/accept\_insecure\_gui = U
snc/accept\_insecure\_rfc = U

...



Direct mapping of one regulation

## Multi Compliance Framework: Compliance & Cybersecurity Management

#### Multiple Compliance Regulations


Nearly all Regulations comprise Information Security obligations

Management of Cybersecurity Compliance

Manage Cybersecurity Compliance using well-known standards

**Operational IT Security** 

"Compliance View" enabled operational IT Security



 Requirements Unification and Compliance Lifecycle Management

## The chain – from obligation to control

SOX. GDPR....

detailed, specific, technical, implementation-related descriptive, process-oriented, risk-focused Harmonization Layer **EU NIS2 Directive / DE NIS2UmsuCG IT-Grundschutz SAP Security Baseline** ISO 27001 **ABAP Stack Secure Configuration** N:M N:M N:M N:M = **EU NIS2 Art. 21.2. (h) NETENC-A** Annex-A.8.24 APP.4.2.A1 snc/enable = 1 snc/data\_protection/min = 3 **Encryption of ABAP Secure SAP ABAP** Policies and procedures Use of cryptography snc/data protection/max = 3 regarding the use of **Network Connections** stack configuration snc/data\_protection/use = 3 cryptography and, where snc/accept insecure gui = U appropriate, encryption snc/accept\_insecure\_rfc = U DE NIS2UmsuCG §30 (2) Nr. 8 Kryptografie und Verschlüsselung

Standards based MC mapping

Including Management layer (ISMS)

## Multi Compliance Framework: Compliance & Cybersecurity Management

## Multiple Compliance Regulations


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
"Compliance View" enabled operational IT Security





 Cybersecurity is no State, but a continuous Management Process

## **DIME - Cybersecurity Compliance & Assurance point of view**



## **Viewpoints on Cybersecurity Compliance**



## Cybersecurity Architecture point of view

The objective to secure business processes in your SAP landscape end-to-end, leveraging all relevant capabilities of SAP's Cybersecurity and Compliance solutions and services.



## **Cybersecurity Compliance & Assurance point of view**

The need to adhere to Cybersecurity regulations, hence to rely on standards-based security and control management as well as auditing and monitoring your SAP landscape.



## Cybersecurity Assessment point of view

The desire for detailed insights into the Cybersecurity as-is situation, induced by uncertainty surrounding the current measures in the SAP landscape and the fear of "open flanks".

## Implementing Compliance – The chain: Why? What? How?

WHY?
Obligations



EU NIS2 Art. 21.2. (h)

Policies and procedures regarding the use of cryptography and, where appropriate, encryption

WHAT?
Requirements



Use of cryptography

IT Grundschutz APP.4.2.A1
Secure SAP ABAP
stack configuration

HOW?
Controls



SAP Security Baseline NETENC-A

**Encryption of ABAP Network Connections** 

Secure SAP ABAP Stack

snc/enable = 1
snc/data\_protection/min = 3
snc/data\_protection/max = 3
snc/data\_protection/use = 3

. . .

## **Viewpoints on Cybersecurity Compliance**



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## **Security Architecture: Example**



#### **SAP Access Control**

- Identity Management
- Authorization Management



#### SAP FocusedRun

o Configuration Management



#### **SAP Maintenance Planer**

Patch Management




#### **SAP Code Vulnerabilty Analyzer**

o Secure Development



#### **SAP Enterprise Thread Detection**

Security information & event management



https://discovery-center.cloud.sap/index.html#/refArchCatalog/

## **Customer Individual Architecture Discussions:**

- Cloud ALM vs. FRUN?
- SAP IAG vs. Access Controls?
- Move to ETD Cloud Edition?
- CVA OnPrem or via ABAP Cloud Platform?
- How to cover non-ABAP code?
- How to integrate all security telemetry?
- Central Reporting of findings into incident management
- How to report identified risks?

## **Viewpoints on Cybersecurity Compliance**



## Cybersecurity Architecture point of view

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The need to adhere to Cybersecurity regulations, hence to rely on standards-based security and control management as well as auditing and monitoring your SAP landscape.



## **Cybersecurity Assessment point of view**


The desire for detailed insights into the Cybersecurity as-is situation, induced by uncertainty surrounding the current measures in the SAP landscape and the fear of "open flanks".

In more detail – The Assessment Point of View

### What does "Assessment Point of View" mean?


- The security assessment is an essential **comprehensive evaluation** of the security of an organization's SAP system or landscape to identify vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and risks.
- It is a service delivery which will be executed within 12-15 service days.
- The target is to cover all security aspects in a way, that an organization gets the transparency of its SAP systems, security strengths and weaknesses.
- It will enable the organization to implement effective measures to protect its assets and ensure the continuity of its business operations.






## What is the Foundation of the Security Assessment?

- The assessment 's understanding is to consider all security recommendations which are available by SAP or external security resources.
- The target is to have an agile approach where content is permanently extended and improved.














## What are the Scope Elements of the Security Assessment?

This overview shows from each scope element examples of the relevant deliverables.

	_ ~		. •
Secure	Conti	Gura	tion
Secure	COILL	Sulu	

Parameter Evaluation

Key and certificate Management

**Attack Surface Reduction** 

**RFC Protection** 

#### **Patch Management**

HotNews & Prio High Security Notes

Patch Management Strategy

Service Pack Strategy

DB, OS, Host Agent Validation

#### **Integration Security**

Secure Integration Strategy

RFC and Web Service Communication

Zero Trust Strategy

**External Access Strategy** 

#### Infrastructure

Design & Architecture

**Network Segmentation** 

**Encryption Strategies** 

Web Dispatcher Setup

#### **Cyber Security Strategy**

Logging & Monitoring Strategy

**Detection and Recovery Processes** 

Forensic Strategy

**Business Process Threat Detection** 

#### **Cloud Strategy**

**Cloud Integration** 

Baseline configuration

Cloud configuration validation

Cloud Application Lifecycle

#### **Code Security**

**Custom Code Vulnerabilities** 

**Custom Code Quality Management** 

3<sup>rd</sup> Party Code Security

**ABAP Code Principles** 

#### **Authorization Principles**

**Design & Concepts** 

**Critical Authorizations & Combinations** 

**Creation and Maintenance Process** 

**Special Access & Recertification** 

#### **Security Processes**

**Threat Management Processes** 

**Identity and Access Management** 

**Vulnerability Management Process** 

Central Monitoring & Configuration validation

#### **Web Security**

Attack Surface Reduction

Trusted Network Zones & Clickjacking

**Encryption Enforcements** 

Secure Web Integration

#### **Authentication & Single Sign-On**

**Password Security** 

Single Sign-On Strategy

**Hash Protection** 

**Multi-Factor Authentication** 

#### **Identity & Access Management**


**Provisioning Strategy** 

Compliant User Management

**Administration Concepts** 


## **Customer's Security Requirements**

• **TARGET:** With the Cybersecurity and Compliance Management Service we are <u>bringing together</u> <u>SAP´s recommendations with the compliance requirements</u> and additional customer requirements.



## **SAP Security Review Service Extract**

**Overview Secure Environment & System** 



## SCFG-001 | Profile Parameter Hardening



Baseline	Parameter	Value As-Is	▼ Value To-Be	<b>▼</b> Compliance <b>▼</b>	<b>▼</b> Baseline	Parameter	Value As-Is	Value To-Be
CM05	icm/security_log	LOGFILE=/usr/sap/GE0/D01/log/dev_icm_sec-%y-%m	LOGFILE=access_sec_%y_%m,LEVEL=3,MAXSIZEKB=5000.	. Not Compliant	51 RGS4	gw/reg_no_conn_info	25	F
ICM08	is/HTTP/show_detailed_errors	FALSE	FALSE	Compliant				
ICM10	icm/trace_secured_data	FALSE	FALSE	Compliant	52 RGS5	gw/acl_mode		-
ICM11	icm/accept_remote_trace_level		0 FALSE	Compliant	53 RGS6	gw/monitor		0
ICM13	ssl/ciphersuites	135:PFS:HIGH::EC_P256:EC_HIGH	550:PFS:HIGH:TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV::EC_HIGH:+EC_OPT	Not Compliant	54 RGS7	gw/resolve_phys_addr		1
ICM14	ssl/client_ciphersuites	150:PFS:HIGH::EC_P256:EC_HIGH	550:PFS:HIGH:TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV::EC_HIGH:+EC_OPT	Not Compliant	55 RGS9	gw/sim_mode		0
ICM15	csi/enable		1	1 Compliant	56 RGS10	gw/rem_start	SSH SHELL	DISABLED
ICM24	icm/HTTPS/client sni enabled	TRUE	TRUE	Compliant	57 SNC1	snc/enable		1
RFCC6	auth/rfc_authority_check		6	6 Compliant	58 SNC2	snc/data_protection/max		3
RFCC7	ucon/rfc/active		1	1 Compliant				J
RFCC8	rfc/selftrust		1	0 Not Compliant	59 SNC3	snc/data_protection/min		3
RFCC10	rfc/reject_expired_passwd		1	1 Compliant	60 SNC4	snc/data_protection/use		3
NECCII	gw/accept_remote_trace_level			O COMDIANC	61 SNC6	snc/accept_insecure_cpic		1
RFCC12	sec/ral_enabled_for_rfc		0	1 Not Compliant	62 SNC7	snc/accept_insecure_gui		1 U
SSS05	service/protectedwebmethods	SDEFAULT	SDEFAULT	Compliant	63 SNC9	snc/accept_insecure_rfc		1
SAPGUI01	sapgui/user_scripting	FALSE	FALSE	Compliant	64 SNC10	snc/permit_insecure_start		1
SAPGUI02	sapgui/user_scripting_per_user	FALSE	TRUE	ОК	65 SNC11	snc/force_login_screen		0
SAPGUI03	sapgui/user_scripting_disable_recording	FALSE	FALSE	Compliant	66 SNC14			0
ETD01	etd event sender/enable	off	on	OK		snc/only_encrypted_gui		•
PPA1	login/min password diff		3	2 Compliant	67 SNC15	snc/only_encrypted_rfc		0
PPA2	login/min_password_digits		1	1 Compliant	68 RCB4	rfc/callback_security_method		3
PPA3	login/min_password_lng		8	8 Compliant	69 LWEC3	icf/set_HTTPonly_flag_on_cookies		0
PPA4	login/min_password_letters		1	1 Compliant	70 ICM06	icm/HTTP/logging_0	PREFIX=/,LOGFILE=/usr/sap/GE0/D01/log/http-%y-%	PREFIX=/, LOGFILE=icmhttph.log, FILTER=SAPSI
PPA5	login/min_password_lowercase		1	1 Compliant	71 ICM28	icm/HTTP/logging_client_0	PREFIX=/,LOGFILE=/usr/sap/GE0/D01/log/http-clie	PREFIX=/,LOGFILE=access-\$(SAPSYSTEMNAME
PPA6	login/min_password_uppercase		1	1 Compliant	72 ICM29	icf/cors enabled		0
PPA7	login/min_password_appercase		0	1 Not Compliant	73 ICM31	icm/HTTP/trace_info	FALSE	FALSE
PPA8	login/password_compliance_to_current_policy		0	1 Not Compliant				
PPA10	login/password_downwards_compatibility		0	0 Compliant	74 ICM32	ict/allow_space_before_colon	FALSE	FALSE
PPA11	login/failed_user_auto_unlock		0	0 Compliant	75 ICM33	icf/reject_expired_passwd		0
PPA12	login/fails_to_user_lock		3	6 Compliant	/b IVISS2	ms/monitor		U
PPA13	login/password change waittime		1	1 Compliant	77 MSS3	ms/admin_port		0
PPA14	login/password_criange_wattante		90	90 Compliant	78 MSS4	ms/http_logging		1
PPA15	login/password_history_size		15	5 Compliant	79 MSS5	ms/HTTP/logging_0	PREFIX=/,LOGFILE=/usr/sap/GE0/D01/log/ms-http-%	SWITCHTF=day,LOGFORMAT=%t %a %u %r %s %
PPA16	login/password_max_idle_initial		14	14 Compliant	80 RGS11	gw/logging	ACTION=Ss LOGFILE=gw log-%y-%m-%d SWITCHTF=day	ACTION=SPXMZ
PPA17	login/password max idle productive		0	91 Not Compliant	81 DYN01	dynp/checkskip1screen	OFF	ALI
PPA19	login/password_hash_algorithm	encoding=RFC2307, algorithm=iSSHA-1, iterations	encoding=RFC2307,algorithm=iSSHA-512,iteration	Not Compliant		,		0
PPA20	login/show_detailed_errors	Chesang-in ersor, algorithm-issist 2, heradons	O	0 Compliant	82 SAL15	rsau/selection_slots	1	0
PPA21	login/disable_cpic		0	1 Not Compliant	83 AUT01	auth/object_disabling_active	N	N
PPA22	login/fails_to_session_end		3	3 Compliant	84 AUT02	auth/check/calltransaction		2
SSOA1	login/ticket expiration time		8:00	8 Compliant	85 SAPGUI04	sapgui/nwbc_scripting	FALSE	FALSE
SSOA2	login/ticket_only_by_https		1	1 Compliant	86 SAPGUI05	sapgui/user_scripting_set_readonly	FALSE	FALSE
SSOA3	login/ticket_only_to_host		1	1 Compliant	87 SAPGUI06	sapgui/user_scripting_force_notification	FALSE	TRUE
SSOA3	login/create_sso2_ticket		3	1 Not Compliant	88 ABAP02	abap/ext debugging possible		0
SSOA5	login/create_sso2_ticket		1	1 Compliant		= 00 0=		FALSE
OPPA1	rdisp/accept_remote_trace_level		Ō	0 Compliant	89 ICM26	is/HTTP/show_server_header	FALSE	
OPPA1	rec/client	OFF	ALL	Not Compliant	90 ACL01	service/http/acl_file	NaN	needs to be manually checked - 1495075 - Acce
SAL1	rsau/enable	OTT	1	1 Compliant	91 ACL02	service/https/acl_file	NaN	needs to be manually checked - 1495075 - Acce
SALI SAL3	,		1		92 XX01	abap/path_normalization	ext	EXT
SAL5	rsau/user_selection rsau/integrity		1	1 Compliant 1 Compliant	93 MISC01	rdisp/TRACE_HIDE_SEC_DATA	on	ON
CALA			1	1 Compliant			400	
8 SAL4 9 SAL14	rsau/log_peer_address		0	1 Not Compliant	94 MISC02	rdisp/gui_auto_logout	180	U



## SSOA-002 | Password Policies & Technical User



#### Finding:


- There is currently no enhanced protection policy in place for critical users like SAP Standard User, High Authorized Technical User and Fire Fighters or SAP administrators. The possibility to overwrite and strengthen the system wide security policy with Security Policies is not in use.
- Several login profile parameter are currently not set to extend the complexity of end user passwords. E.g. could the password length of the current global default of 8 extended to the maximum for technical user.

#### **Business Implication:**

- Stronger security policies especially for critical and high authorized users are mitigating the risk of penetration and misuse of those user accounts.
- User impersonation could allow access to high critical and high authorized user accounts which could lead to an impact to system integrity and availability as well as data confidentiality and integrity.

#### **Recommendation:**

- Strengthen the login profile parameter to extend the password complexity with Transaction SECPOL. As of SAP\_BASIS release 7.31 Security Policies can be used to configure user specific password rules. For example it is recommended that for technical or service accounts the password length is refined with: MIN\_PASSWORD\_LENGTH ≥ 30.
- Evaluate the risk and usage of high authorized user accounts and consider the usage of special security policies.
- Follow the Single Sign-On strategy and deactivate passwords if the SSO login is enabled.





# SSOA-003 | Single Sign-On Utilization Single Sign-On Strategy

#### Finding:

- Single Sign-On is generally considered in the current setup but dialog user logs are showing that there are still user accounts using passwords for logon.
- An extensive use of SAML2 for web applications is documented and in use whereas SAPGUI should be tunneled via the Business client. The usage of secure authentication mechanisms like with X.509 certificates or Kerberos for SAPGUI doesn't seem to-be in use at the moment.

#### **Business Implication:**

- An end-to-end Single Sign-On strategy avoids password challenges like:
  - Weak password hashes
  - Weak passwords
  - Password renewal and delivery actions
  - Protection of password hash tables
- Without a consistent Single Sign-On enablement a solution which operates onPrem and in the cloud is not ready for modern hybrid scenarios. Passwords are always a common target for common cyber attacks.

#### **Recommendation:**

- It is recommended to move on with the SSO rollout to enforce SSO for all users on all channels. Because there are always use cases where direct GUI access is required it is also recommended to use SSO for key users with SSO.
- Single Sign-On should be established for all Frontend-Channels as well as for administrative use.
- 320991 Error codes during logon (list)



Event	Event Status	Event Short Text	Category	Event Weighting	SAL Event Documentation
AU1	**	Logon successful (type=&A, method=&C)	Logon	Severe	The user has logged onto the system. <zus-possible (="Access" types="" types):<=""></zus-possible> A = Dialog logon (SAP GUI) B = Background job start H = HTTP logon U = User switch (internal call) " = Password check (API, internal call) M = SMTP P = ABAP Push Channel (APC) E = Build of a shared object area (internal call) O = AutoABAP (internal call) T = Server startup procedure (internal call) V = SAP start service (internal call) U = SAP start service (internal call) V = SAP start service (internal call) V = SAP start service (internal call) V = BGRFC watchdog (internal call) <zus-possible (="authentication" methods="" modes):<=""></zus-possible> P = Password T = Logon ticket t = Assertion ticket X = X.509 certificate S = SNC R = RFC ticket A = Authorized impersonation (background processing) E = External (EXTID) U = User switch S = HTTP security session 2 = SAML1 0 = OAuth2 N = SPNego a = APC Session  If a user type or a method is not listed here, you might find more information in SAP Note 320991. A minimum kernel patch level is required to record the method. For more information, see SAP Note 1789518.

AP System	AS Instance	Date	Time	Cl.	Message ID	User	Termina	Peer	TCode	Program	Audit Log Msg. Text	Note	Variabl.	Variable	2 Variable 3
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	06:53:54	300	AU1	90020199	PC27A	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	07:09:31	300	AU2	90023529	PC27A	19	SESS	SAPMSYST	Logon failed (reason=1, type=A, method=P)		A	1	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	07:09:38	300	AU2	90023529	PC27A	19	SESS	SAPMSYST	Logon failed (reason=1, type=A, method=P)		A	1	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	07:10:16	300	AU1	91999977	PC27A	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	07:12:28	300	AU1	90023529	PC27A	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		Α	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	08:04:03	300	AU1	ELIASA	5CG01	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	08:36:23	300	AU1	92000122	PC2AT	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	08:37:02	302	AU1	MALLAVARAMP	PCOUD	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		Α	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:14:33	300	AU1	92000122	PC2AT	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		Α	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:21:06	302	AU1	KANDPALK	PC27L	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		Α	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:21:56	302	AU2	90018379	PC2AX	19	SESS	SAPMSYST	Logon failed (reason=1, type=A, method=P)		Α	1	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:22:15	300	AU1	KANDPALK	PC27L	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:22:38	302	AU2	90018379	PC2AX	19	SESS	SAPMSYST	Logon failed (reason=1, type=A, method=P)		A	1	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:23:05	302	AU2	90018379	PC2AX	19	SESS	SAPMSYST	Logon failed (reason=1, type=A, method=P)		A	1	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:39:18	800	AU1	AE_ZAIDIS	C11-S	10	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		Α	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:40:27	300	AU1	91999976	PC27L	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:44:17	300	AU1	CENTOFB	PC2AT	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:51:26	300	AU1	92000107	PC2AT	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		Α	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	10:01:16	300	AU1	92000122	PC2AT	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		Α	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	10:03:38	300	AU2	ELIASA	5CG01	19	SESS	SAPMSYST	Logon failed (reason=1, type=A, method=P)		Α	1	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	10:03:44	300	AU1	ELIASA	5CG01	19	5000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	10:06:48	302	AU1	OSS_USER	dewdf	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	10:10:10	302	AU1	91999977	PC27A	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P



## SCFG-005 | SAP Standard User

#### Finding:


- The standard user setup was also reviewed in the ECR system. In this system was SAP\* not protected and a login with the default password was possible.
- Additionally, are RFC connections in this system available which are pointing to central systems like the DSMS which is again connected to other production systems. These security misconfigurations are representing a serious attack chain.

#### **Business Implication:**


 The misuse of DDIC in batch jobs or interfaces is a target to misuse to elevate privileges within the system or remote systems. Due to the broad privileges of this user the system and its data could be fundamentally affected.

#### **Recommendation:**

- Setup SAP System recommendation to check the status of all SAP Standard Users permanently.
- Execute real-time alerting once standard users are getting unlocked and used.
- Replace DDIC within Batch job processing and RFC communication.



## **EXAMPLE: NIS2 to Security Baseline Mapping**



## **Cybersecurity Compliance Management service offerings**

#### **SAP Store Service**

- Enablement service for NIS2 Cybersecurity and Compliance Management
- SAP Store URL: https://store.sap.com/dcp/en/

#### Architecture and planning service for cybersecurity and compliance

- Service Scope : Cybersecurity Compliance Management (NIS2 enablement)
- Service URL: Architecture and planning service for cybersecurity and compliance

#### **Related publications**

- SAP Community blog: <a href="https://community.sap.com/t5/technology-blogs-by-sap/sap-enablement-service-for-nis2-cybersecurity/ba-p/13637332">https://community.sap.com/t5/technology-blogs-by-sap/sap-enablement-service-for-nis2-cybersecurity/ba-p/13637332</a>
- LinkedIn blog: <n/a yet>

#### **Information**

Service ID: 50112354

#### **Related Services**

SO #1 Security Baseline Discovery
 & Cybersecurity Strategy

• SO #5 Cybersecurity Reference Architecture





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## Links

**SAP Process Control:** 

https://www.sap.com/products/financial-management/internal-control.html

SAST Solution:

https://help.sap.com/docs/SAP\_FORTIFY\_BY\_MICRO\_FOCUS?locale=en-US