

SAP NIS2 - Multi Compliance Service

Public

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Speakers

Michael Altmaier



Principal Security Architect

Agenda

- EU NIS2 The Directive in a nutshell
- MCF A Framework for Multi-Compliance
- Points of View Start for Managing Cybersecurity Compliance
- In more detail
 The Assessment Point of View
- Customer Success SAP Services for Cybersecurity Compliance

Drivers for Managing Cybersecurity Compliance



We aim to assist our customers in aligning their SAP security measures with regulations, widelyaccepted norms, and established standards. RISE or GROW with SAP and face new Cybersecurity challenges in the SAP landscape?

Impacted by new Cybersecurity regulations and must take appropriate action?

Unsure about the status of currently implemented SAP Cybersecurity measures?

Prepared for upcoming Cybersecurity compliance audits or working on existing findings?



Implementing Compliance – The chain: Why? What? How?

WHY? Obligations



WHAT? Requirements



HOW? Controls



EU NIS2 requirements and affected industries




Up to 1 month: Final report



Fines:

- Personal liability of the management board
- high fines for breaches of security measures: up to 10 Mio. Euro or 2% of global turnover



*furthermore: Companies with critical operations and public policy implications, systemic risks or cross-border impacts

EU NIS2 minimum requirements for Cybersecurity

Facilities within the EU must implement at least the following cybersecurity measures (risk management) to protect the IT and networks of their critical services:

- Policies on risk analysis and information system security
- Prevention, detection, and handling of cyber incidents
- Policies and procedures regarding cryptography and encryption
- Human Resources Security
- Access control
- Asset management
- Use of multi-factor authentication or continuous authentication solutions
- Policies and procedures to assess risk management measures

- Basic cyber hygiene practices and cybersecurity training
- Use of secure voice, video, and text communication
- Use of secured emergency communication systems
- Business continuity management with backup and disaster recovery, crisis management
- Security in the supply chain, up to secure development at suppliers
- Security in the acquisition, development and maintenance of IT and network systems, incl. vulnerability management and disclosure


In the selection and implementation of measures, institutions shall use an all-hazards approach.

MCF – A Framework for Multi-Compliance

What is the relationship between NIS2 Directive article and ABAP profile parameter?

EU NIS2 ART. 21.2 (h) AND SNC/ENABLE = 1


EU NIS2 Art 21.2. (h) – Direct mapping




Kryptografie und Verschlüsselung

11


Multi Compliance Framework: Compliance & Cybersecurity Management




The chain – from obligation to control



Multi Compliance Framework: Compliance & Cybersecurity Management



DIME - Cybersecurity Compliance & Assurance point of view



Viewpoints on Cybersecurity Compliance



Cybersecurity Architecture point of view

The objective to secure business processes in your SAP landscape end-to-end, leveraging all relevant capabilities of SAP's Cybersecurity and Compliance solutions and services.



Cybersecurity Compliance & Assurance point of view

The need to adhere to Cybersecurity regulations, hence to rely on standards-based security and control management as well as auditing and monitoring your SAP landscape.



Cybersecurity Assessment point of view

The desire for detailed insights into the Cybersecurity as-is situation, induced by uncertainty surrounding the current measures in the SAP landscape and the fear of "open flanks".

Implementing Compliance – The chain: Why? What? How?

WHY? Obligations



Requirements

WHAT?



EU NIS2 Art. 21.2. (h)

Policies and procedures regarding the use of cryptography and, where appropriate, encryption

ISO 27001 Annex-A.8.24
Use of cryptography

IT Grundschutz APP.4.2.A1

Secure SAP ABAP stack configuration

Controls

HOW?



SAP Security Baseline
SAP Security Baseline NETENC-A

Encryption of ABAP Network Connections

Secure SAP ABAP Stack

snc/enable = 1 snc/data_protection/min = 3 snc/data_protection/max = 3 snc/data_protection/use = 3

•••

Viewpoints on Cybersecurity Compliance



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The objective to secure business processes in your SAP landscape end-to-end, leveraging all relevant capabilities of SAP's Cybersecurity and Compliance solutions and services.



Cybersecurity Compliance & Assurance point of view


The need to adhere to Cybersecurity regulations, hence to rely on standards-based security and control management as well as auditing and monitoring your SAP landscape.



Cybersecurity Assessment point of view

The desire for detailed insights into the Cybersecurity as-is situation, induced by uncertainty surrounding the current measures in the SAP landscape and the fear of "open flanks".

Security Architecture: Example



Customer Individual Architecture Discussions:

Cloud ALM vs. FRUN?

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- SAP IAG vs. Access Controls?
- Move to ETD Cloud Edition?
- CVA OnPrem or via ABAP Cloud Platform?
- How to cover non-ABAP code?
- How to integrate all security telemetry?
- Central Reporting of findings
 into incident management
- How to report identified risks?

Viewpoints on Cybersecurity Compliance



Cybersecurity Architecture point of view

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Cybersecurity Compliance & Assurance point of view

The need to adhere to Cybersecurity regulations, hence to rely on standards-based security and control management as well as auditing and monitoring your SAP landscape.




Cybersecurity Assessment point of view

The desire for detailed insights into the Cybersecurity as-is situation, induced by uncertainty surrounding the current measures in the SAP landscape and the fear of "open flanks".

In more detail – The Assessment Point of View

What does "Assessment Point of View" mean?


- The security assessment is an essential comprehensive evaluation of the security of an organization's SAP system or landscape to identify vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and risks.
- It is a service delivery which will be executed within 12-15 service days.
- The target is to cover all security aspects in a way, that an organization gets the transparency of its SAP systems, security strengths and weaknesses.
- It will enable the organization to implement effective measures to protect its assets and ensure the continuity of its business operations.



1 Filter								
g 1 Patter	· ·							
CODE-010	Custom Code Security	CW 48	2023	MEDIUM	1			
CODE-011	Custom Code Security	CW 48	2023	MEDIUM	1			
CODE-012	Custom Code Security	CW 48	2023	MEDIUM	1			
INFR-001	Infrastructure & Network	CW 48	2023	ОК	1			
OSSC-001	OS Security	CW 48	2023	ОК	1			
OSSC-002	DB Security	CW 48	2023	ОК	1	Recommend	led Notes	
						ID	Security Notes	
8 & 1 Filter						AUTH-001	(No Value)	1
ID	Finding					AUTH-003	(No Value)	1
AUTH-001	(No Value)					AUTH-004	(No Value)	1
AUTH-003	(No Value)					AUTH-005	(No Value)	1
AUTH-004	(No Value)					AUTH-006	(No Value)	1
AUTH-005	(No Value)					AUTH-006	(No value)	1

What is the Foundation of the Security Assessment?

- The assessment ´s understanding is to consider all security recommendations which are available by SAP or external security resources.
- The target is to have an agile approach where content is permanently extended and improved.



Securing Remote Function Calls (RFC) SAP Security Recommendations



SAP Security Baseline Template Version 1.9

Security Compliance	Security Governance				Emergency Concept	
Secure Operation	Users and Authorizations				Security Review and Monitoring	
Secure Setup	Secure Configur	ation	Communi Secur		Data Security	
Secure Code	Security M of SA	/aintena P Code	nce	Custom Code Security		
Infrastructure Security	Network Secu	rity Operating Sy Database			Frontend Security	



attribute isn't maintained. This setting ha

ClientCertificateAuthentication

been deprecated and will be removed.

Assertio

implement identity propagation for interactive user sessions

Authenticatio

What are the Scope Elements of the Security Assessment?

This overview shows from each scope element examples of the relevant deliverables.

Secure Configuration

Parameter Evaluation

Key and certificate Management

Attack Surface Reduction

RFC Protection

Patch Management

HotNews & Prio High Security Notes

Patch Management Strategy

Service Pack Strategy

DB, OS, Host Agent Validation

Integration Security

Secure Integration Strategy

RFC and Web Service Communication

Zero Trust Strategy

External Access Strategy

Infrastructure
Design & Architecture
Network Segmentation
Encryption Strategies
Web Dispatcher Setup

Cyber Security Strategy

Logging & Monitoring Strategy

Detection and Recovery Processes

Forensic Strategy

Business Process Threat Detection

Cloud Strategy

Cloud Integration

Baseline configuration

Cloud configuration validation

Cloud Application Lifecycle

Code Security Custom Code Vulnerabilities Custom Code Quality Management

3rd Party Code Security

ABAP Code Principles

Authorization Principles

Design & Concepts

Critical Authorizations & Combinations

Creation and Maintenance Process

Special Access & Recertification

Security Processes

Threat Management Processes

Identity and Access Management

Vulnerability Management Process

Central Monitoring & Configuration validation

Web Security

Attack Surface Reduction

Trusted Network Zones & Clickjacking

Encryption Enforcements

Secure Web Integration

Authentication & Single Sign-On

Password Security

Single Sign-On Strategy

Hash Protection

Multi-Factor Authentication

Identity & Access Management


Provisioning Strategy

Compliant User Management

Administration Concepts


Customer 's Security Requirements

 TARGET: With the Cybersecurity and Compliance Management Service we are <u>bringing together</u> <u>SAP's recommendations with the compliance requirements</u> and additional customer requirements.



SAP Security Review Service Extract

Overview Secure Environment & System



SCFG-001 | Profile Parameter Hardening

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2	100
1	
1	
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Baseline	Parameter	Value As-Is	▼ Value To-Be	Compliance	Baseline	Parameter	Value As-Is	Value To-Be	Compliance
0 ICM05	icm/security_log	LOGFILE=/usr/sap/GE0/D01/log/dev_icm_sec-%y-%m	LOGFILE=access_sec_%y_%m,LEVEL=3,MAXSIZEKB=500	D Not Compliant	51 RGS4	gw/reg_no_conn_info	25		255 Compliant
1 ICM08	is/HTTP/show_detailed_errors	FALSE	FALSE	Compliant			23		
2 ICM10	icm/trace_secured_data	FALSE	FALSE	Compliant	52 RGS5	gw/acl_mode			1 Compliant
3 ICM11	icm/accept_remote_trace_level		0 FALSE	Compliant	53 RGS6	gw/monitor)	1 Not Compliant
4 ICM13	ssl/ciphersuites	135:PFS:HIGH::EC_P256:EC_HIGH	550:PFS:HIGH:TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV::EC_HIGH:+EC_OPT	Not Compliant	54 RGS7	gw/resolve_phys_addr		1	1 Compliant
5 ICM14	ssl/client_ciphersuites	150:PFS:HIGH::EC_P256:EC_HIGH	550:PFS:HIGH:TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV::EC_HIGH:+EC_OPT	Not Compliant	55 RGS9	gw/sim_mode			0 Compliant
6 ICM15	csi/enable		1	1 Compliant	56 RGS10	gw/rem_start	SSH_SHELL	DISABLED	Not Compliant
7 ICM24	icm/HTTPS/client_sni_enabled	TRUE	TRUE	Compliant	57 SNC1	snc/enable		1	1 Compliant
8 RFCC6	auth/rfc_authority_check		6	6 Compliant	58 SNC2	snc/data_protection/max		3	3 Compliant
9 RFCC7	ucon/rfc/active		1	1 Compliant	59 SNC3	snc/data protection/min		3	3 Compliant
10 RFCC8	rfc/selftrust		1	0 Not Compliant	60 SNC4	snc/data_protection/use			3 Compliant
11 RFCC10	rfc/reject_expired_passwd		1	1 Compliant	61 SNC6				
12 NFCC11	gw/accept_remote_trace_iever		Ū	o compliant		snc/accept_insecure_cpic		L	0 Not Compliant
13 RFCC12	sec/ral_enabled_for_rfc		0	1 Not Compliant	62 SNC7	snc/accept_insecure_gui		LU	Not Compliant
14 SSS05	service/protectedwebmethods	SDEFAULT	SDEFAULT	Compliant	63 SNC9	snc/accept_insecure_rfc		1	0 Not Compliant
15 SAPGUI01	sapgui/user_scripting	FALSE	FALSE	Compliant	64 SNC10	snc/permit_insecure_start		1	0 Not Compliant
16 SAPGUI02	sapgui/user_scripting_per_user	FALSE	TRUE	OK	65 SNC11	snc/force_login_screen)	0 Compliant
17 SAPGUI03	sapgui/user_scripting_disable_recording	FALSE	FALSE	Compliant	66 SNC14	snc/only_encrypted_gui)	1 Not Compliant
18 ETD01	etd_event_conder/enable	latt	on		67 SNC15	snc/only_encrypted_rfc)	1 Not Compliant
19 PPA1	login/min_password_diff		3	2 Compliant	68 RCB4	rfc/callback security method		3	3 Compliant
20 PPA2	login/min_password_digits		1	1 Compliant	69 LWEC3	icf/set_HTTPonly_flag_on_cookies		1	0 Compliant
21 PPA3	login/min_password_lng		8	8 Compliant	70 ICM06	icm/HTTP/logging_0	PREFIX=/,LOGFILE=/usr/sap/GE0/D01/log/http-%v-%	PREFIX=/, LOGFILE=icmhttph.log, FILTER=SAPSMD,	Not Compliant
22 PPA4	login/min_password_letters		1	1 Compliant				PREFIX=/,LOGFILE=access-\$(SAPSYSTEMNAME)-client	Not Compliant
23 PPA5	login/min_password_lowercase		1	1 Compliant	71 ICM28	icm/HTTP/logging_client_0	PREFIX=/,LOGFILE=/usr/sap/GE0/D01/log/http-clie	PREFIX=/,LUGFILE=access-\$(SAPSYSTEMINAME)-client	
24 PPA6	login/min_password_uppercase		1	1 Compliant	72 ICM29	icf/cors_enabled			1 Not Compliant
25 PPA7 26 PPA8	login/min_password_specials		0	1 Not Compliant	73 ICM31	icm/HTTP/trace_info	FALSE	FALSE	Compliant
26 PPA8 27 PPA10	login/password_compliance_to_current_policy		0	1 Not Compliant 0 Compliant	74 ICM32	ict/allow_space_before_colon	FALSE	FALSE	Compliant
27 PPA10 28 PPA11	login/password_downwards_compatibility login/failed_user_auto_unlock		0	0 Compliant	75 ICM33	icf/reject_expired_passwd)	1 Not Compliant
29 PPA12	login/fails_to_user_lock		2	6 Compliant	70 WISSZ	ms/monitor		Ū	U compliant
30 PPA13	login/password_change_waittime		1	1 Compliant	77 MSS3	ms/admin_port)	0 Compliant
31 PPA14	login/password_change_waittine		90	90 Compliant	78 MSS4	ms/http_logging			1 Compliant
32 PPA15	login/password_history_size		15	5 Compliant	79 MSS5	ms/HTTP/logging 0	PREFIX=/,LOGFILE=/usr/sap/GE0/D01/log/ms-http-%	SWITCHTF=day,LOGFORMAT=%t %a %u %r %s %b %{Host	
33 PPA16	login/password_max_idle_initial		14	14 Compliant	80 RGS11	gw/logging	ACTION=Ss LOGFILE=gw_log-%y-%m-%d SWITCHTF=day	ACTION=SPXMZ	Not Compliant
34 PPA17	login/password_max_idle_productive		0	91 Not Compliant	81 DYN01	dynp/checkskip1screen	OFF	ALL	Not Compliant
35 PPA19	login/password_hash_algorithm	encoding=RFC2307, algorithm=iSSHA-1, iterations	encoding=RFC2307,algorithm=iSSHA-512,iteration	Not Compliant	81 DTN01 82 SAL15		1		
36 PPA20	login/show_detailed_errors		0	0 Compliant		rsau/selection_slots	1	-	10 Compliant
37 PPA21	login/disable_cpic		0	1 Not Compliant	83 AUT01	auth/object_disabling_active	N	N	Compliant
38 PPA22	login/fails_to_session_end		3	3 Compliant	84 AUT02	auth/check/calltransaction		2	3 Not Compliant
39 SSOA1	login/ticket_expiration_time	08	00	8 Compliant	85 SAPGUI04	sapgui/nwbc_scripting	FALSE	FALSE	Compliant
40 SSOA2	login/ticket_only_by_https		1	1 Compliant	86 SAPGUI05	sapgui/user_scripting_set_readonly	FALSE	FALSE	Compliant
41 SSOA3	login/ticket_only_to_host		1	1 Compliant	87 SAPGUI06	sapgui/user_scripting_force_notification	FALSE	TRUE	Not Compliant
42 SSOA4	login/create_sso2_ticket		3	1 Not Compliant	88 ABAP02	abap/ext_debugging_possible)	2 Not Compliant
43 SSOA5	login/accept_sso2_ticket		1	1 Compliant	89 ICM26	is/HTTP/show_server_header	FALSE	FALSE	Compliant
44 OPPA1	rdisp/accept_remote_trace_level		0	0 Compliant	90 ACL01	service/http/acl_file	NaN	needs to be manually checked - 1495075 - Access	Not Compliant
45 OPPA2	rec/client	OFF	ALL	Not Compliant	91 ACL02	service/https/acl_file	NaN	needs to be manually checked - 1495075 - Access	Not Compliant
46 SAL1	rsau/enable		1	1 Compliant	92 XX01		ext	EXT	Compliant
47 SAL3	rsau/user_selection		1	1 Compliant		abap/path_normalization		ON	
48 SAL4	rsau/integrity		1	1 Compliant	93 MISC01	rdisp/TRACE_HIDE_SEC_DATA	on		Compliant
49 SAL14	rsau/log_peer_address		0	1 Not Compliant	94 MISC02	rdisp/gui_auto_logout	180		3600 Compliant
50 SSC1	system/secure_communication	ON	ON	Compliant	97 MISC07	ixml/dtd_restriction	prohibited	prohibited	Compliant

Public

SSOA-002 | Password Policies & Technical User

Finding:

*

- There is currently no enhanced protection policy in place for critical users like SAP Standard User, High Authorized Technical User and Fire Fighters or SAP administrators. The possibility to overwrite and strengthen the system wide security policy with Security Policies is not in use.
- Several login profile parameter are currently not set to extend the complexity of end user passwords. E.g. could the password length of the current global default of 8 extended to the maximum for technical user.

Business Implication:

- Stronger security policies especially for critical and high authorized users are mitigating the risk of penetration and misuse of those user accounts.
- User impersonation could allow access to high critical and high authorized user accounts which could lead to an impact to system integrity and availability as well as data confidentiality and integrity.

Recommendation:

- Strengthen the login profile parameter to extend the password complexity with Transaction SECPOL. As of SAP_BASIS release 7.31 Security Policies can be used to configure user specific password rules. For example it is recommended that for technical or service accounts the password length is refined with: MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH ≥ 30.
- Evaluate the risk and usage of high authorized user accounts and consider the usage of special security policies.
- Follow the Single Sign-On strategy and deactivate passwords if the SSO login is enabled.

Display View "Security Policy": Overview									
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Dialog Structure	Security Policy								
Security Policy Attributes	Security Policy	Short Text	Changed On						



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SSOA-003 | Single Sign-On Utilization Single Sign-On Strategy

Finding:

- Single Sign-On is generally considered in the current setup but dialog user logs are showing that there are still user accounts using passwords for logon.
- An extensive use of SAML2 for web applications is documented and in use whereas SAPGUI should be tunneled via the Business client. The usage of secure authentication mechanisms like with X.509 certificates or Kerberos for SAPGUI doesn't seem to-be in use at the moment.

Business Implication:

- An end-to-end Single Sign-On strategy avoids password challenges like:
 - Weak password hashes
 - Weak passwords
 - Password renewal and delivery actions
 - Protection of password hash tables
- Without a consistent Single Sign-On enablement a solution which operates onPrem and in the cloud is not ready for modern hybrid scenarios. Passwords are always a common target for common cyber attacks.

Recommendation:

- It is recommended to move on with the SSO rollout to enforce SSO for all users on all channels. Because there are always use cases where direct GUI access is required it is also recommended to use SSO for key users with SSO.
- Single Sign-On should be established for all Frontend-Channels as well as for administrative use.
- <u>320991 Error codes during logon (list)</u>

ent	Event Status	Event Short Text	Category	Event Weighting	SAL Event Documentation
JI	*	Logon successful (type=&A, method=&C)	Logon		The user has logged onto the system. <zu>Possible Types (= Access types): A = Dialog logon (SAP GUI) B = Background job start H = HTTP logon U = User switch (internal call) '' = Password check (API, internal call) M = SMTP P = ABAP Push Channel (APC) E = Build of a shared object area (internal call) O = AutoABAP (internal call) T = Server startup procedure (internal call) U = JAVA virtual machine (internal call) V = SAP start service (internal call) U = BGRFC watchdog (internal call) W = BGRFC watchdog (internal call) V = BGRFC watchdog (internal call) V = SAP start service (internal call) V = BGRFC watchdog (internal call) W = BGRFC watchdog (internal call) W = BGRFC watchdog (internal call) V = Logon ticket t = Assertion ticket X = X.509 certificate S = SNC R = RFC ticket A = Authorized impersonation (background processing) E = External (EXTID) U = User switch S = HTTP security session 2 = SAML2 1 = SAML1 0 = OAuth2 N = SPNego a = APC session If a user type or a method is not listed here, you might find more information in SAP Note 320991. A minimum kernel patch level is required</zu>
					to record the method. For more information, see SAP Note 1789518.

AU

	AS Instance	Date	Time	Cl.	Message ID					Program	Audit Log Msg. Text	Note	Variabl.,	Variable :	2 Variable
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	06:53:54	300	AU1	90020199	PC27A	. 19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	07:09:31	300	AU2	90023529	PC27A	. 19	SESS	SAPMSYST	Logon failed (reason=1, type=A, method=P)		A	1	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	07:09:38	300	AU2	90023529	PC27A	. 19	SESS	SAPMSYST	Logon failed (reason=1, type=A, method=P)		A	1	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	07:10:16	300	AU1	91999977	PC27A	. 19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	07:12:28	300	AU1	90023529	PC27A	. 19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	08:04:03	300	AU1	ELIASA	5CG01	. 19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	08:36:23	300	AU1	92000122	PC2AT.	. 19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	08:37:02	302	AU1	MALLAVARAMP	PCOUD.	. 19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	Ρ
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:14:33	300	AU1	92000122	PC2AT.	. 19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:21:06	302	AU1	KANDPALK	PC27L	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:21:56	302	AU2	90018379	PC2AX.	. 19	SESS	SAPMSYST	Logon failed (reason=1, type=A, method=P)		A	1	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:22:15	300	AU1	KANDPALK	PC27L	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:22:38	302	AU2	90018379	PC2AX	. 19	SESS	SAPMSYST	Logon failed (reason=1, type=A, method=P)		A	1	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:23:05	302	AU2	90018379	PC2AX.	. 19	SESS	SAPMSYST	Logon failed (reason=1, type=A, method=P)		A	1	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:39:18	800	AU1	AE_ZAIDIS	C11-S	10	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:40:27	300	AU1	91999976	PC27L	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:44:17	300	AU1	CENTOFB	PC2AT.	. 19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	Ρ
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	09:51:26	300	AU1	92000107	PC2AT.	. 19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	Ρ
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	10:01:16	300	AU1	92000122	PC2AT.	. 19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	Ρ
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	10:03:38	300	AU2	ELIASA	5CG01	. 19	SESS	SAPMSYST	Logon failed (reason=1, type=A, method=P)		A	1	Ρ
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	10:03:44	300	AU1	ELIASA	5CG01	. 19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	10:06:48	302	AU1	OSS_USER	dewdf	19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P
GE0	syge0s4aps01_GE0_01	13.02.2023	10:10:10	302	AU1	91999977	PC27A	. 19	S000	SAPMSYST	Logon successful (type=A, method=P)		A	0	P

SCFG-005 | SAP Standard User

Check

System: Instance User: Date: Time:

Prof.Para login/no login/pa

login/pa

Client^{*} Us

Finding:

- The standard user setup was also reviewed in the ECR system. In this system was SAP* not protected and a login with the default password was possible.
- Additionally, are RFC connections in this system available which are pointing to central systems like the DSMS which is again connected to other production systems. These security misconfigurations are representing a serious attack chain.

Business Implication:


• The misuse of DDIC in batch jobs or interfaces is a target to misuse to elevate privileges within the system or remote systems. Due to the broad privileges of this user the system and its data could be fundamentally affected.

Recommendation:

- Setup SAP System recommendation to check the status of all SAP Standard Users permanently.
- Execute real-time alerting once standard users are getting unlocked and used.
- Replace DDIC within Batch job processing and RFC communication.

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the Passwords of Standard Users in All C	lients	Display Profile Param	eter Details			
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		Parameter Group			Login	
n nutomatic_user_sapstar 0		Parameter Description			Control of the automatic login	user SAP*
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		Dynamic Parameter			No	
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EXAMPLE: NIS2 to Security Baseline Mapping



Cybersecurity Compliance Management services

SAP Store Service

- Enablement service for NIS2 Cybersecurity and Compliance Management
- SAP Store URL: <u>https://store.sap.com/dcp/en/</u>

Architecture and planning service for cybersecurity and compliance

- Service Scope : Cybersecurity Compliance Management (CSCM enablement)
- Service URL: <u>Architecture and planning service for cybersecurity and compliance</u>


Related publications

SAP Community blog:

https://community.sap.com/t5/technology-blogs-by-sap/sap-enablement-service-for-nis2-cybersecurity/ba-p/13637332

LinkedIn blog:

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/nis2-stands-most-expansive-cybersecurity-directive-europe-derksen-xcupf/



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NIS2 Compliance enablement Cybersecurity Management for SAP landscapes

The EU NIS2 Directive enhances mandatory Cybersecurity enforcement measures. This service depicts the stipulations of the NIS2 Directive in detail, offering comprehensive support for Cybersecurity Compliance in SAP landscapes across multiple stages:

The service addresses the requirement for compliance with Cybersecurity regulations, thereby relying on a standards-based regulation and information security management, prominently featuring NIS2. From an architectural standpoint, the objective is to secure business processes in SAP from end-to-end, by utilizing all the relevant features offered by SAP's Cybersecurity and Compliance solutions and services. Assessments further meet the need for detailed insights into the current Cybersecurity status of SAP systems, addressing concerns about the adequacy of existing measures and the fear of undetected vulnerabilities.

Business Needs

- Regardless if you RISE or GROW with SAP, Cybersecurity remains critical and satisfying regulations a challenge.
- You require a complete and comprehensive Cybersecurity compliance management solution and want to follow an agile approach to address regulatory requirements.

Value and Benefits

• Detailed understanding and clear scoping of a solution for managing compliance initiatives in SAP landscapes to address cybersecurity measures for meeting regulatory demands.

Delivery Approach and Scope

- Facilitated by workshops, a Cybersecurity Management for SAP landscapes is scoped, in conjunction with a multi-compliance framework featuring EU NIS2.
- In addition, a roadmap for the implementation of this multi-compliance management is developed.
- The implementation approach can be specifically tailored to SAP Risk and Assurance Management.

CRM Number (SKU) 50112354

Effort 15 Days (incl. multiple half-day Workshops)

Contacts and support

• Oliver Derksen

Related services

- Execution and implementation service for cybersecurity and compliance (50109625)
- Architecture and Planning service for cybersecurity and compliance (50112354)



Enablement service for NIS2 Compliance Management

The EU NIS2 Directive enhances mandatory Cybersecurity enforcement measures, for instance by stipulating early incident reporting, broadening risk management strategies, and specifying a new level of executive responsibility for Cybersecurity.

We will delve into and discuss the potential impacts of NIS2 requirements on SAP landscapes, utilizing S/4HANA as an illustrative case study, and presenting an approach to sustainably manage cybersecurity regulations in general, with a special emphasis on NIS2.

Business Needs

- Regardless if you RISE or GROW with SAP, Cybersecurity remains critical and satisfying regulations a challenge.
- NIS2 stands for the most expansive Cybersecurity directive in Europe to date.
- Identify approaches to address requirements affecting SAP landscapes, raising from this new regulation.

Value and Benefits

- Gain detailed insights into the Cybersecurity Points of View supporting the definition of a roadmap establishing a NIS2 compliant SAP landscape.
- Obtain how to align Cybersecurity measures with regulatory requirements and supportive standards for managing Cybersecurity.
- Learn how to navigate current measures in your SAP landscape and to identify "open flanks".

Delivery Approach and Scope

- This service will be delivered as an introductory workshop.
- The session will outline the Cybersecurity Points of View and provide outlook for the determination of a roadmap how to move on in establishing a NIS2 compliant SAP landscape.

CRM Number (SKU) 50164685

Effort Two hours virtual workshop

Contacts and support

• Oliver Derksen

Related services

- Execution and implementation service for cybersecurity and compliance (50109625)
- Architecture and Planning service for cybersecurity and compliance (50112354)



Thank you!

Michael Altmaier

Principal Security Architect Michael.Altmaier@SAP.com

